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Thehealthiness of children can be a major source of consumption
and investment benefits for a society. In the U.S., for example, we
spend nearly $1 billion annually on pediatric services and publicly
allocate $800 million yearly (1970) for predominantly children-
directed health care.' In this paper my purpose is to propose and to
statistically test a model of the family as a provider-protector of the
health of its children. Since our society is interested in protecting
and enhancing the state of health of our children, and since the
family is the primary social unit for child care, analysis such as that
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Institute and a grant from Wharton Economic Forecasting Associates. The data used in this study
were kindly made available by the National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Medicine, from
the survey 'Contrasting Forms of Health Care Delivery" financed by the Ford Foundation.
Robert Eilers, Robert Pollak, Walter Tunnessen (M.D.), Jeffrey Harris (M.D.), David Kessner
(MD), Ross Anthony, Patricia Inman, and Andrew Reschovsky were all most helpful at various
stages of this project.I also appreciate the careful comments of Michael Grossman, David
Salkever, and Lee Benham on an earlier version of this paper.
215
-jpresented here becomes indispensable for sound social policy. The health-re results developed below are offered as a beginning step toward a what the policy model of children's health. balanced Section 2 is a brief outline of a concept of "healthiness" for have exp statistical and policy analysis and contains a description of a model section of the demand for health care wherein the effects on healthiness of incorpon health care activities (e.g., doctor visits, good nutrition, rest) are sumptioi uncertain. The model yields a demand for health care activities analysis
with the usual price and income specifications plus a relationship The in
between quantities consumed and the means and variances of the three ba
effects of health activities on healthiness. sumer g
In Section 3 this model of the demand for health care activities is goods (x)
applied to the family's decisions to buy preve,ntive and curative ness (A).2
doctor service and to allocate parents' time for the protection of healthin
children's health. "Production functions" of the family's provision The el
of children's health are specified, and models of the demand for
child health care by working and nonworking mothers are pre- Height,
sented. count, s
In Section 4 there are econometric estimates of the health care candidat
production and demand models proposed in Section 3 for one major
class of childhood diseases—ear, nose, and throat (ENT) infections. may also
The production model shows that parents' time and doctor visits do absence
have, on average, a positive effect on children's health but that the o
final outcome is extremely uncertain. The relationship of the health characte
care technology to mother's education and the source of physician value, 0
services(public or private) is explored. Estimation of the demand element
model provides price and income elasticities as well as a test of the The c
uncertainty model of Section 2. element
Section 4 contains a few tentative policy conclusions. National services
health insurance with shallow coverage, as well as most policies attribute
operating through the economic variables of prices and income, (A0) and
appear to have only minor positive effects on children's ENT
health. Changes in medical technology, parent health knowledge, (1) ft(:
and the patterns of adult-child interaction appear to be more where




2.HEALTH CARE DEMAND WHEN OUTCOMES ARE relatedi
UNCERTAIN healthin
are
Unlike many consumption activities in which consumers know is a secol
exactly what they are getting for their dollars, the consumption of importar
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health-related services can be extremely uncertain. We rarely know
what the exact effects of a doctor visit, a night's rest, or a "well-
balanced" meal will be on our physical healthiness. At best we
have expectations and a sense of the range of possible results. This
section outlines a consumer model of health care demand that
incorporates these uncertain effects on health of health care con-
sumption activities. The model forms the basis for our empirical
analysis of the family's provision for children's health.
The individual (or family) is assumed to derive satisfaction from
three basic sets of consumption goods—non-health-related con-
sumer goods (denoted by the vector y), health-related consumer
goods (x), and a vector of measurable attributes of physical healthi-
ness (A).2 The new element here is the formal inclusion of physical
healthiness into the consumer's allocation problem.3
The elements of the vector of health attributes (A) are cardinal
measures of (physical)health-related human characteristics .'
Height,weight, body temperature, blood pressure, white blood
count, serum protein level, eye acuity, and hearing range are all
candidates for membership in A. In addition to such continuous
measures of the body's physical state, the health-attribute vector
may also include elements whose values are 0 or 1 to signify the
absence or presence of qualitative characteristics. The 0, 1 ele-
ments of A might measure the presence or absence of such
characteristics, as inguinal hernia, stenoused (narrowed) cardiac
value, or a fractured femur. Clearly, some configurations of the
elements of A will be preferable to others.
The consumer has control over some, perhaps most, of the
elements ofA through his consumption of health-related goods and
services (x). In a certain world, the level (or presence) of an
will be a function of the initial level of health attributes
(A0) and the current consumption of x:
(1)
where >0 and <0, respectively, define "health-
enhancing" and "health-reducing" goods and services.
In an uncertain world, however, the selection of x will not be
sufficient to define A unmistakably. First, independent ofA0 and of
the chosen levels x, the individual may be exposed to random, health-
related incidents that will alter A1, These exogenous influences on
healthiness—accidents over which the individual has no control—
are represented here by the continuous random variable,There
is a second source of uncertainty, however, which is at least equally
important, the uncertainty regarding the health consequences of
217 The Family Provision of Children's Healthchanges in any specific health-related good or service. Even know- 13d and
ing A0, x, and ii, the consumer often cannot predict perfectly the
marginal health effectiveness of changes in x, (i =1...N).Indeed, Given t
medical science may not even know the exact marginal impact of display th
each input. These uncertain input effects can be represented by a shifts in p
vector of continuous random variables,whosetypical element is the demai
The random variables = 1... N;t =1...T)represent the possible,
technological uncertainty of using health care inputs x1(i =1...N)
-changesin
to affect attributes =1...T).Given such uncertainty, the health Sections 3
attribute production function must be generalized to: family's pi
(la) A1 A0,
Here,itself is a random variable whose distribution, conditional
onr and past attributes A0, is defined byf(andthe distributions of
ü and the 3.THE FAI
Theconsumer's allocation behavior can now be characterized by HEALTI'
theselection of a vector x and a vector w that maximize expected The modE
utility, where health attributes, A, are random variables conditional applicatio
on x. The commodities in y are assumed to affect satisfaction di- Section 2.
reedy and with certainty. The health-related goods—in addition to family's d
their (uncertain) effects on A—may also generate direct and certain health-ret
consumer satisfaction. For example, food, cigarettes, and exercise motivated
can provide direct consumption benefits. Doctor visits can be a its, and p:
source of comfort and emotional support; hospitals often provide The foc
very attractive "hotel" services. Health-related goods (x) play a decision-i
dual role. Expected utility therefore assumes the general form: vices. It i
preferenc
(2) V =J.. .JU[y,x,A(x)jf(A,. . dA,. . assumed
Consumers are assumed to purchase x and y so as to maximize v direct cm
subject to constraints on their time and income. Four fi
Assuming that V is a continuous concave function, that the when the
income and time constraints are linear, and that the distributions of activities-
u, andare independent and members of the class of two ly's usual
parameter distributions, a vector of health care demand functions of (4) the flu
the form: may, of cc
with chili
(3) x, = çb,(p,.,p0,lp.,.../J.T, . .I3NT, (YVNT;AO) assumed
three
can be specified, where p.,. is the vector of prices (including a wage implicatic
as the price of leisure) for x, p0 is the vector of prices for y, i is reported
exogenous income, and A0 is the vector of initial attribute levels. The mc
The parameters /.Lt anddefine the "location"(e.g., mean) and Science,
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and definethe location and spread of the distribution of
Given the vectors p., /3, andthe demand schedules in (3)
display the usual Slutsky properties with respect to exogenous
shifts in prices and income. No general a priori predictions about
the demand effects of changes in the elements of p., /3, orol, are
possible, however.8 The effect on health care consumption of
changes in an uncertain health care technology is an empirical issue.
Sections 3 and 4 provide one set of answers in the context of the
family's provision for its children's health.
3.THE FAMILY'S PROVISION FOR ITS CHILDREN'S
HEALTH: A MODEL SPECIFICATION
Themodel developed here, and formally tested in Section 4, is an
application to children's health of the demand analysis presented in
Section 2. Specifically, the model is an attempt to structure the
family's decisions to spend income and parents' time on three child
health-related goods and services—curative care("illness-
motivated") doctor visits, preventive care ("check-up") doctor vis-
its, and parents' time with children.
The focus of the model is on the mother. She is assumed to be the
decision-maker for and the family's provider of child health ser-
vices. It is her scarce time that is used in raising the child and her
preferences define the family's choices for child health care. She is
assumed to be predominantly interested in her and her family's
direct consumption benefits of having healthy children.9
Four facts of the family's environment will be taken as given
when the mother decides on the level and mix of child health care
activities—(1) the level of health insurance coverage, (2) the fami-
iy's usual provider of doctor care, (3) the mother's work status, and
(4) the number of children in the family. Each of the four factors
may, of course, influence the level of doctor visits and parents' time
with children (we will test for this), but the factors themselves are
assumed to be unaffected by changes in the consumption of the
three health care commodities. I will discuss the validity and
implication of these assumptions when the statistical results are
reported in Section 4.
The model will be tested against data from a National Academy of
Science, Institute of Medicine, survey of Washington, D.C.,
families. The survey includes detailed information on children's
219 The Family Provision of Children's Healthutilization of health care facilities, family socioeconomic informa- to be suffe
tion, and, important for this study, the results of a thorough ear, being ear i
nose, and throat examination by an independent NAS team of this
physicians.'9 The sample is composed predominantly of black diagnosed
children between the ages of six months and twelve years from (denoted I
lower- and middle-income families (see the Data Appendix). infection
The analysis will be developed in two steps. First, a health health attr
attribute production function correspondingto(la)will be variable. I
specified (Part A, below) and estimated for children's ear, nose, and child frorr
throat diseases (Part A, Section 4). Next, the results of the produc- The fur
tion function model will be integrated into our demand equation attribute r
specifications (Part B, below) and these demand equations will be /
estimated (Part B, Section 4). The demand results will offer a first (4) In
test of the health care demand specification presented in Equation \





The health attribute production function specified here is for distribute
children's ear, nose, and throat infections. Table 1 summarizes the be normal
prevalence rates for the major ENT diseases in the NAS sample The cii
population. Approximately 11 per cent of the children were found variable5
(EARSCA
describes
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to be suffering from some ENT disease, the major source of illness
being ear infections. This study will concentrate on two aspects of
this disease pattem—(1) a "clean bill" of ENT health with no
diagnosed ENT infections at the time of medical examination
(denoted by NOSICK), and (2) the absence of diagnosed inner ear
infection (denoted by NOEARINF).'1 In both cases the dependent
health attribute is specified as a dichotomous sick (0) or not sick (1)
variable. In effect we are trying to explain the probability that a
child from the sample will have an ENT disease.
The functional form chosen for the NOSICK and NOEARINF
attribute models is the logit specification, which can be written as:
(4) In(m)=lnA0+
whereis the child's probability of NOSICK or NOEARINF, A0 is
a measure of the child's initial health state, x,is the child's
consumption of health care commodities, and the andare
random coefficients reflecting the uncertainty of the health care
process. In the work that follows, isassumed to be normally
distributed with meanand variancewhereas ü1 is assumed to
be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance
The child's initial health state, A0,is summarized by three
variables.Thepresence(EARSCAR =1)orabsence
(EARSCAR =0) of significant scarring of the tympanic membrane
describes the child's history of inner ear infections. A history of
three or more colds a year (COLDHIST =1,otherwise 0) is also
used to measure a susceptibility to ENT infections. In addition, the
age of the child (AGE) is included in our health attribute model.
Previous epidemiological studies have shown that older children
are less susceptible to inner ear infections.'3
The health care goods that are assumed to influence a child's
chances of ENT infections are the number of preventive doctor
visits (DOCPRV) in the past year, the number of curative doctor
visits (DOCCUR)forENT infections in the past six months, and the
average number of hours per day one or both parents spend with
the child in play or conversation (PARTIME/N).'4 Family income
per person (INCPC) is used as a single measure of the quality of the
family's material environment. Unlike studies of adult healthiness,
in which income and health are simultaneously determined, it is
reasonable to assume for this study of children's ENT health that
there is only the one direction of causation—from income to health.
DOCPRV, DOCCUR, PARTIME/N, and INCPC are expected to
enhance health and therefore are positively related to the child's
I
221 The Family Provision of Children's Healthprobabilityof NOSICK and NOEARINF. EARSCAR and DOCCU]
COLDHIST should be negatively related and the child's AGE satisfacti
positively related to the probability of the healthy state. forms an
The two fundamental premises of the health care production- health g
demand model of Section 2 were (1) that the effects of health inputs extension
on health outputs will differ across inputs and be uncertain, and
(2) that consumers will adjust their consumption in response to Incomeand
perceivedchanges in this health technology.
It is hypothesized here that the average effects of health inputs The deim
(DOCPRV, DOCCUR, PARTIME/N) on health outputs (NOSICK, nonworki
NOEARINF) and the variability of these effects will depend on the mated for
education of the mother and the professional source of health care. the specil
There is some sociological evidence to suggest that more highly differs a
educated parents follow a physician's advice more closely and are models.
more likely to know the warning signals of illness than are parents Both v
with less education." For both reasons we anticipate the average days,
effect (/3k)ofcare to rise and the uncertainty tofall as the activities
TIME)t mother s education rises. d f The provider of medical services may also influence 13 and oj. anor t.
The doctor's role is not only to diagnose illness and dispense office
toeducate patients and encourage good curative and
preventive health practices. The provider format that permits we trave
office or continued personal physican care is more likely to succeed in this
h education-encouragement task. All else equal, patients receiving p ysicial
analysis care from solo private physicians or small-group practitioners may
therefore face higher f3's and lower than patients receiving
care from public clinics or outpatient services. I.
Totest for the differential effects of education and provider type 5\ —t
onthe means and variances of health care inputs, our health
/ — L
attributeproduction functions will be estimated for four subsam- where
pies of the NAS survey population: (1) a low education (mother's mothers.
education less than eight years)-public (clinic and outpatient) personal
provider sample, (2) a high school education (niother's education The in
nine—twelve years)-public provider sample, (3) a high school mother i
education-private (solo and group) provider sample, and (4) a exogeno
college-private provider sample. the won
In Section 4, Part A, I will present and discuss estimates of the working
production function of children's ENT health. WAGE).
(6) INC=
B. where
The mother's allocation problem, as characterized in Section 2, is to mothers.
spend family income and parents' time on non-health goods and The p
222 Inman 223DOCCUR, DOCPRV, and PARTIME in order to maximize family
satisfaction, of which the uncertain ENT health of the children
forms an integral part. The basic demand specification for the three
health goods is given by (3) and elaborated by the following
extensions.
Incomeand Prices
Thedemand model tested here distinguishes between working and
nonworking mothers, and separate demand systems will be esti-
mated for each. Both mothers face income and time constraints, but
the specification of the two constraints for the two types of mothers
differs and this difference generates testably distinct demand
models.
Both working and nonworking mothers are limited to 24-hour
days, 365 days a year. Their scarce time can be allocated to
activities without the children (tL), time with the children (PAR-
TIME), time invested in providing doctor visits for the children (tfl),
and, for the working mother, time on the job (tie). The time required
for doctor visits (to) is defined by the number of visits multiplied by
the time cost per visit (TIMCOST). The time cost per visit equals
the travel time to and from the physician plus waiting time at the
office or clinic.16 As I have assumed that the family's source of
physician care is predetermined, TIMCOST is exogenous in this
analysis and plays the role of a parameter in the household's
consumption technology—to = TIMCOST*(DOCPRV + DOC-
CUR). The yearly time constraint is therefore:
(5) T = t,. + PARTIME + TIM COST*(DOCPRV + DOCCUR) + t,,
where t, > 0 for working mothers and= 0 for nonworking
mothers. Assuming mother needs eight hours a day to herself for
personal health and sanity, T = 16*365 = 5,840 hours.
The income constraint (INC) facing the working and nonworking
mother is defined by the level of husband's earnings (h, assumed
exogenous) plus family nonwork income (z,alsoexogenous). For
the working wife there is an additional source of income equal to
working time (t,,.) times her (exogenously set) hourly wage (WIF-
WAGE).'7 Thus, the yearly income constraint is given by:
(6) INC =h+ Z + WIFWAGE*t,r
where again t1. >0 for working mothers and t,, =0for nonworking
mothers.
The purchase of non-health-related goods and services (y) costs

































Section 2, is to
Ith goods andPy perbundle, whereas a preventive or curative doctor visit costs a The
doctor'sfee per visit (DOCFEE).'8 The family's income constraint Technology
limitsthe purchase of y and DOCPRV and DOCCUR by: Estimates
(6a)INC =pyy + DOCFEE* (DOCCUR + DOCPRV) provide e
Maximizing the mother's expected utility subject to the time (5) uncerti
and income (6a) constraints yields (a la Section 2) a health care p
demand system for nonworking mothers=0)of the form:
(7) PARTIME =f0(p,,, DOCFEE, TIMCOST, INCI) parents'
(8) DOCPRV =g0(p,, DOCFEE, TIMCOST, INC(S) estimateç
Estimates
(9) DOCCUR =h0(p,,, DOCFEE, TIMCOST, INCI) the squar
and for working mothers>0) of the form: error, nor
VARDO(
(10)PARTIME FULINC,FULFEE, estimates
(11)DOCPRV = FULINC,FULFEE, WIFWAGEI) subsampi
(12)DOCCUR =h,,.(py,FULINC, FULFEE, WIFWAGEI) variables
changes t
whereFULINC =h+ z + T*WIFWAGE, and FULFEE =DOC goods an
FEE + WIFWAGE*TIMCOST. As the NAS survey of households An a pi
does not give estimates of h and z, FULINC is approximated by our
÷ INC underthe assumption that all working Bayesian
mothers work forty hours a week for fifty weeks each year. The the (3's,
direction and extent of bias this assumption introduces in our health
estimate of income effects are discussed in Section 4. subjectiv
The specification of the working-mother model in (10)—(12) has distributi
implicitly assumed that the woman is free to vary working hours, likelihoo
t11., to meet her preferences. This may or may not be true. If the technolo,
woman is constrained to workhours or not at all, the working- posterior
mother's time constraint changes to: educatio:
(5a)T -i,,.=Tfi=t1+ PARTIME + TIMCOST*(DOCCUR + DOCPRV)
where TH measures available time for "home" activities. The TheChild's
incomeconstraint reduôes to a fixed INC =h+ z +
1 Under this assumption of rationed work hours, the derived demand The hea
system for the working wife becomes: consume
allocatioi
(lOa)PARTIME 'fier(pu,INC,DOCFEE, TIMCOST, T11 susceptil
(ha)DOCPRV INC, DOCFEE, TIMCOST, THI.) parents
(12a)DOCCURhur(py, INC, DOCFEE, TIMCOST, TH() to be po
The "rationed" (lOa)—(12a) and the "equilibrium" (10)—(12) work In additi
ing-wife models will be compared in Section 4. will be n
224
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Technology
Estimatesof the ENT health attribute production function will
provide estimates of the average impact of care and the variability
or uncertainty of that impact on ENT health for each of the three
inputs for each of the four wife education-provider type sub-
samples. The estimates of the average effects (/3k)ofcurative doctor
care (MEANDOCC), preventive doctor visits (MEANDOCP), and
parents' time (MEANPART) are given by the corresponding
estimated regressioncoefficients fromlogit model in(4).
Estimates of the uncertainty of input effects are provided by
the square of the corresponding regression coefficient's standard
error, normalized to a common sample size, and will be denoted by
VARDOCC, VARDOCP, and VARPART, respectively. These
estimates of means and variances from each of the four
subsamples will then be used as child-specific independent
variables in the demand models (7)—(12a) to test for the effects of
changes in health care technology on the demand for health-related
goods and services.
An a priori motivation for this specification of the /3's and in
our demand model is to assume that the mother behaves as a
Bayesian. Starting with an uninformative (flat) prior distribution on
the /3's, she observes a sample of children passing through the
health care system—her own children and her neighbors'—and
subjectively "estimates" a posterior distribution. This posterior
distribution will correspond to the distribution of our maximum
likelihood estimates of the parameters of the logit health care
technology. The sample of children used to obtain each mother's
posterior distribution is assumed to come from that mother's
education-provider subgroup.'9
TheChild's Health
Thehealthiness of a child at the time of the mother's decision to
consume health services is also expected to influence household
allocations. A child with a history of past illnesses may be more
susceptible to ENT diseases and thus induce closer monitoring by
parents and doctor. Using a history of colds (COLDHIST1, 0
otherwise) as an indicator of susceptibility, we expect COLD HIST
to be positively related to PARTIME, DOCPRV, and DOCCUR.
In addition, a child who displays current symptoms of illness
will be more likely to be taken to the doctor for curative care. Our
225 The Family Provision of Children's Health
tor visit costs a
ome constraint
JR by:


















10)—(12) worksurvey provides information on children's complaints of dizziness,
earaches, loss of hearing, and plugged ears (EARPAIN =1,0 other-
wise), which we expect to be positively related to the decision to
seek curative care (DOCCUR).
How the mother reacts to health susceptibility and complaints of
her children may be a function of the characteristics of the child and
the family. Specifically, we test for the effects of child age (AGE),
sex (MALE), and the number of other children in the family under
twelve (N) on the mother's decision to seek care given the presence
of COLDHIST or EARPAIN.
ParentPreferences and Health Attitudes
Parents'attitudes toward the medical care system as well as their
view of children's role in the family should also influence the
family's demand for child health care. Such attitudes are introduced
as (1,0) dummy variables. One might expect parents who profess to
have faith in the curative power of doctors (DOCFAITH =1)to be
more likely to use curative care, perhaps at the expense of preven-
tive care and parents' time. Parents who consider their health to be
good or excellent (PARHEAL =1)are presumably enjoying the
benefits of healthiness and therefore wish to protect the health of
their children—either to further protect their own health or because
healthy parents and healthy children are complements for many
consumption activities. Future-oriented parents (FUTURE =1)—
indicated by disagreement with the statement "Nowadays a person
has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of
itself'—might presumably be sensitive to the investment as well
as the consumption benefits of health care and thus increase
health-enhancing activities. Also included are variables to reflect
possible difference in reference group norms in regard to the
importance andlor effectiveness of health care—(BLACK1) if the
family is black and (RELIGION =1)if the family attends religious
services once or more a week. The final family variable tested is
whether the mother is currently married (MARD =1,0 otherwise).
There may be some sharing of child-raising tasks, thereby reducing
the individual time costs of the activities causing an increase in
demand.
TheDemand System's Error Structure
Thedemand specification is completed by the assumption of an








































IInmanThe error term from demand equation i (say, DOCCUR) is distrib-
uted N(0, and need not be independent of the error term from
demand equationj (say, DOCPRV), distributed as N(0, That is,
E(w1,Wj)0 is assumed for this health care demand system.
4.THE FAMILY'S PROVISION FOR ITS CHILDREN'S
HEALTH: MODEL ESTIMATION
Theresults of the model's estimation are summarized below. Part A
presents and discusses the estimation of the ENT health attribute
production functions. Part B summarizes the testing of our model of
the demand for child health care.
Table 2 the maximum likelihood estimates of the parame-
ters of the logistic specification for the NOSICK and NOEARINF
health attributes for the four education-provider subsamples of our
child population. The maximum likelihood estimation procedure
converged in all case within ten iterations. The test statistic for the
overall significance of the production model, —2 log (likelihood
ratio), is distributed as x2withseven degrees of freedom and is
reported in the final column. Thevalues are all highly significant
except for the high school private subsample. For this subsample,
we can reject the null hypothesis that all are in fact zero at the
0.84confidencelevel for the NOSICK equation but at only the 0.5
level for the NOEARINF equation.
The parameter estimatesforthechild'shealth history
(EARSCAR, COLDHIST) are negative, as expected, and generally
exceed their standard errors. Also, as expected, older children
(AGE) have fewer colds, fewer ear infections, and are generally
healthier. Family income per person (INCPC) is never a significant
determinant of children's ENT health, though there is some reason
to believe this measured effect of income is biased toward zero.
(see below, Note 22).
The parameter estimates for curative doctor visits (DOCCUR)
were developed in two stages to remove a possible simultaneity
between DOCCUR and the presence of illness. DOCCUR informa-
227 The Family Provision of Children's Health
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—tion was obtained from a family questionnaire administered from
December 1970 to April 1971. The medical examinations of the
children to determine the presence of ENT infections were begun
in January 1971. Since illness does determine DOCCUR (see the
role of EARPAIN in tables 4 and 5), a simultaneous equation bias in
the production function estimates is therefore a danger. To try to
remove this bias, the maximum likelihood estimates in Table 2 are
basedon a predicted value of DOCCUR as the independent
variable, where the exogenous determinants of DOCCUR are the
nonillness independent variables (prices, income, non-health-
related child characteristics, parent attitudes) of the DOCCUR
demand equation.2°
Six of the eight DOCCUR coefficients are positive, as expected,
but only two are significantly different from zero. There are two
N
51. possiblereasons for the insignificant effects of DOCCUR. First, for
many ENT infections the physician can provide little in the way of
direct and effective treatment. For most viral infections, for exam-
ple, the physician's role is to monitor the disease and to minimize
the long-run dangers rather than to "cure" the present illness. But
::j. second, in cases wherein physicians can offer effective care, par-
ticularly by prescribing antibiotics, patients may often receive this
care by phone rather than through an office visit. The parents
describethe symptoms and the doctor calls the pharmacy. This
format for care is most likely to be used by patients with private
physicians in which a "trusting" doctor-parent relationship has
been established. Indeed, we notice that curative visits are never
significant for the private provider subsamples.
DOCCUR is significant and quite important for children using
public providers. Why? First, when doctors and drugs can help,
children using public providers must generally go for an office visit
C) . . . . . .
toreceive their prescription. Because public clinic physicians
know the parents personally, the phone cannot be used for a
substitute office visit. Second, and perhaps more important, in the
many instances in which the physician cannot provide an effective
treatment for the present ENT incident, the curative visit may still
be a useful preventive encounter. The causes and dangers of the
child's present illness are explained to the parent, who also can be
taught to look for warning signals and to administer future preven-
tive measures. The parent and the child learn by the example of the
illness. Thus curative visits in the past can be an important
sourceof present preventive practices, thereby having a significant
positive impact on NOSICK.
Preventive doctor visits—_check-ups—have a significant positive
-a
229 The Family Provision of Children's Healtheffect on health for children only with college-educated mothers Tb using private providers. This seems reasonable since the check-up
5.
1
visitwith a private physician often is a lesson in child health toward zer practices as well. Because college-educated mothers are more Do the F likely to ask questions and to understand the answers, the impact across the on children's health should be greater for this group. The signifi- attern to cant but negative sign for preventive visits in the eighth grade- this techn public sample is a bit of a puzzle. Rather than argue that public health can clinics are a depository of infectious diseases (thus the more you whereas e visit, the lower the likelihood of health), the cause of this perverse
1
sign is more likely statistical. Our model is probably not well equa' to t
specifiedfor this subsample. Specifically, for these children COLD- normaizin
HIST is not an adequate control for the presence of chronic,
— /•
perhaps allergic, ENT infections. COLDHIST is defined by the can be ofi
pare nts' response to the question, "Does your child have three or parameter
more colds a year?" For each of the other three subsamples, about of theins
35 per cent of the children were described by their parents as not knowi
having a history of colds. The corresponding figure for the eighth probably i
grade-public sample was 25 per cent, suggesting a possible under- A casua
reporting of children with potentially chronic ENT problems. If suggest ti
this is so, and if clinic doctors have encouraged the mothers of these subsampl€
children to come in for regular check-ups, then the negative sign there app
canbe explained. The simpi
Parents' time per child is significant, positive, and quantitatively child s ass
important only for children from the eighth grade-public sample. show
There are reasons, however, to believe that the coefficients on DOCPRV
PARTIME/N may be biased downward. Parents' time per child is for PA
an "input" not only for the provision of children's physical health (—0.
but for other child attributes as well, especially sense of self and for DOCC
intellectual development. As these other facets of child develop- high
ment are likely to be produced jointly with health, any production providers
function of health that omits these "joint products" from the
specification wiil likely lead to biased input coefficient estimates.
The difference between the estimated and the true input coeffi- TABLE3
cients defines the bias and can be measured by PEST —I3TRuE=
whereô is the coefficient of the omitted variable (self-worth, IQ)
regressed on the included variables (PARTIME/N in this instance)
andis the coefficient of the omitted variable regressed on the Sam
dependent variable (NOSICK, NOEARINF). As parents' time per
child is likely to be positively related to self-worth and IQ,8 will be Eighth gra
positive.If we treat child development as a truly joint production High scho
process, then over most ranges of the "outputs" the output attri- High scho
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inputs. Thuswill be negative.2t If these arguments are valid, then
I3TRUE> PEST for PARTIME/N; the estimates in Table 2 are biased
toward zero.22
Do the ENT health care technologies described in Table 2 differ
across the four education-provider subsamples and, if so, is there a
pattern to these differences2 Table 3 summarizes our estimates of
this technology for overall ENT health. Mean effects of the three
health care inputs are equal to the coefficients from NOSICK,
whereas estimates of the variances of their effects are set
equal to the squared value of the coefficients' standard errors after
normalizing standard error estimates for a common sample size
(n =200).Formal tests for the equality of the and of the ok's
can be offered, assuming that the underlying distribution of our
parameter estimates is normal. However, the asymptotic properties
of the "instrumental variable" logit estimator used to deriveare
not known, so such formal tests for equality of coefficients are
probably misplaced.23
A casual inspection of the parameter estimates in Table 3 does
suggest that children from different mother education-provider
subsamples are exposed to different health care technologies. And
there appears to be a pattern to these technological differences.
The simple correlations of mother's years of schooling with each
child's assigned (by membership in a subsample) values ofand
show a positive relationship of parental education to for
DOCPRV (0.85) and negative relationships between education and
for PARTIME/N(—0.74),for DOCCUR (—0.59), and for all
(—0.72 for for PARTIME/N; —0.44 for DOCPRV; —0.86
for DOCCUR). Comparing the high school-public provider and the
high school-private provider subsamples, the children using public
providers can expect higher average effects from curative doctor







Eighth grade—public 3.59 1.84 —1.23 .20 4.37 5.15
High school—public —.01 .31 .01 .07 1.46 1.86
High school—private .11 .39 .04 .14 —.32 2.44
College—private —.45 .20 .47 .10 .45 .36
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visits anda lower variance but lower average effects with lower health, the
variances or preventive visits. uncethin.
This pattern of effects of parental education on the ENT technol- true measu
ogy does not lend strong support to our original hypothesis of a families' p
positive relationship between parental education and the effec- terpretatioi
tiveness of health care inputs. Only for preventive visits (DOCPRV) uncertain t
do we see a clear dominance favoring the health technology The
"available" to children with more highly educated mothers—the
average effect rises and the variance falls as education rises.
As mother's education rises, parental time per child has, a smaller
average impact on health, but the variance or uncertainty of that B.
impact declines as well. But because of the likely bias in our Tables 4 a
estimate of the PARTIME/N coefficient, this conclusion must be model for
considered tentative at best. Although our earlier arguments have The esti
pointed toward a downward bias in estimates of the PARTIMEIN which, be
coefficient, it may also be true that this bias is greatest for the
subsamples with more highly educated mothers. This will be true if likelihood
the impact of a given amount of parents' time on child IQ and sense four assui
of self-worth rises as parental education rises. There is some assumed e
evidence that this is so.25 If the marginal impact of parents' time on of physic
IQ and self-worth (as measured by ô >0) rises as mother's educa- children—
tion rises, and if the tradeoff of child health and IQ or self-worth squares pi
(measured as<0) does not fall in absolute value as education Estimat
rises, then our measure of downward bias in will be larger in linearizati
absolute value for children in the more highly educated mother mothers c
subsample. The results above may therefore underestimate the
true, perhaps positive, relationship between parental education (and signi
and the average health effectiveness of time with children. pected, ai
The apparent dominance of public over private providers in reduces p
Washington, D.C. (discussed above) may explain, in part, the parents' ti
negative correlation between mother's education and the average
effect of DOCCUR. Because the lower-educated mothers almost If taken
always use public providers (which increases /3 for this sample) and for workir
college-educated mothers always use private providers, we are not respect t
able to identify the separate education and provider influences on changes i
the family's health technology for these two groups. If the mea- and perh
sured positive effect of public providers dominates the (assumed) employed.
positive effect of education, then the negative correlations between the labor
I300CCUR and mother's education will result. they wish
Although the evidence here does not force us to reject our work fewi
original hypothesis that education can improve the health technol- than time
ogy, neither does it give it strong support. Overall, the results are occupatio
more suggestive than conclusive. Although health care services do
233
232 InmanB.
appear on balance to have a positive effect on children's ENT
health, the observed outcomes for any particular child are quite
uncertain. The estimates in Table 3 are best interpreted not as a
true measure of the best ENT care technology but rather as selected
families' perceptions of their received technology. Such an in-
terpretation will still be sufficient for testing the effects of an
uncertain technology on the demand for health care commodities.
The results are reported in Part B below.
Tables 4 and 5 summarize the results from estimating the demand
model for working and nonworking mothers, respectively.
The estimation procedure in all cases was ordinary least squares,
which, because each demand equation in the model specifies an
identical vector of independent variables, also provides maximum
likelihood estimates with our assumed error structure.26 Given the
four assumptions outlined at the beginning of Section 3—the
assumed exogeneity of health insurance coverage, family provider
of physician services, mother's work status, and number of
children—ordinary least squares rather than a two-staged least
squares p.rocedure will be justified.27
Estimated equations (la), (2a), and (3a) (Table 4) correspond to a
linearizationof the "equilibrium"specificationfor working
mothers defined by (1O)—(12). FULINC is positively related to
preventive and curative doctor visits (normal goods) but negatively
(and significantly) related to parents' time with children. As ex-
pected, an increase in FULFEE reduces doctor visits and also
reduces parents' time with children. WIFWAGE, the "price" of
parents' time with children, is positively related to PARTIME and
negatively related to doctor visits.
If taken at face value, the results from Equation (la) suggest that
for working mothers "time with children" is an inferior good with
respect to income changes and a Giffen good with respect to
changes in the price of time, WIFWAGE. There is an alternative
and perhaps more plausible explanation for these results. For
employed women in our sample with relatively high-paying jobs,
the labor market does not permit them to work as many hours as
they wish at their current wage. Women who are constrained to
work fewer hours than they prefer value market time more highly
than time in home activities. Thus, for women in high-paying
occupations, children doctor visits that often require time off from
233 The Family Provision of Children's Health
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.041 .042 —.00035—.00042.54" .54"
(.036) (.037) (.062) (.007) (.09) (.09)
.0056 .0048 —.076" —.076' ._Ø53b —.054"
(.0053) (.0047) (.0092) (.0091)(.013) (.014)
—.016 —.021 .013 .015 .097 .11
(.033) (.019) (.057) (.06) (.083) (.08)
—.026" —.0068 —.0054—.024 —.032
(.013) (.013) (.023) (.031) (.033) (.033)
—.015 —.0038 —.0021 —.024 —.0058—.019
(.037) (.038) (.065) (.069) (.094) (.098)
.036 .025 —.059 —.035 —.057 —.017





















































.04 .03 .15 .09 .11 .11
NOTE:Standard error within parentheses.
'Coefficient significantly different from zero at the 0.9 level.
"Coefficient significantly different from zero at the 0.95 level.
work are less attractive relative to off-work parent's time as a
mechanism for protecting children's health. Therefore as WIF-
WAGE rises, time with children is substituted for doctor visits.
Indeed, WIFWAGE as a cross-price effect (i.e., with FULFEE
included) is negatively related to DOCPRV (almost significant at
the 0.9 level) and DOCCUR in equations (2a) and (3a).
This "rationed" working-mother model was tested directly in
(ib), (2b), and (3b). On the criterion of minimizing the sum of squared
residuals, the "equilibrium" model performed slightly better than
the"rationed" model—la(207.2)vs.lb(207.8),2a(513.2)vs.
2b(517.1), 3a(1434) vs. 3b(1438)—but the explanatory power of the
two models for the whole sample is nearly identical. Equations (ic),
(2c), and (3c) split FULFEE into its two components, DOCFEE
and the product TIMCOST*WIFWAGE =TIMWAGE.If the
"equilibrium" model is the correct specification, then the coeffi-
cients on DOCFEE and TIMWAGE should be nearly equal and
equal to the coefficient on FULFEE. Only in the DOCPRV
equation does this appear to hold. In the PARTIME and DOCCUR
equations the coefficient on TIMWAGE is two to five times larger
than the coefficient on DOCFEE.
On balance, then, the rationed working-hours model is probably
closer to the truth, particularly for working mothers with higher
wages. Unfortunately, our wage data are based on broad occupational
237 The Family Provision of Children's Health
































093) (.097)grouping and do not give us enough variation to split the sample increase ii
and test for this structural break directly. However, a "corn- not statisti
promise" model was tested that included INC, DOCFEE, TIM- care techi
COST, and WIFWAGE, each asexplanatory variables. The motivated
coefficient estimates for INC, DOCFEE, and TIMCOST were done all t
identical to those presented in (ib), (2b), and (3b), and the WIF. From our
WAGE coefficients were similar to the estimates in (la), (2a), and mothers a
(3a). The price and income results appear quite robust across all The ren
working-mother specifications. need no e
Equations (lab), (2ab), and (3ab) give a first test of the hypothesis (EARPAII
that health care technologies influence• health care consumption. the expect
Here education-provider dummy variables for each of our four doctor car
subsamples were used in the demand equations. The eighth of sexual c
grade-public dummy was excluded to avoid singularity. The chil- for
dren in the college-private subsample (COLLEGE) receive sig- dren; wor
nificantly more of each health care input than do children in the children.
high school-private (HSPRV), high school-public (HSPUB), or TURE) pa
eighth grade-public subsamples. As the other likely effects of with faith
mother's education on health care consumption are accounted for in preventiv
our model through WIFWAGE, N, and labor force participation, the The pa
education-provider dummy variables may be detecting consump- (Table 5)
tion differences attributable to perceived differences in the family's however,
health care technology. If so, and if the pattern of the ENT children.
technology with respect to mother's education is as described in negative,
Table 3, then mothers are risk averse with respect to their DOCCUI
children's health, preferring the low mean-low variance inputs to have no ai
the high mean-high variance activities, in time c
Equations (ic), (2c), and (3c) provide one direct test of the visit time
mean-variance hypotheses. From Table 3, the expected effects and as parents
the variance of the effects of the health care activities from each The eff
subsample for the NOSICK equation were assigned to each child are basica
according to his subsample membership. The only exception was that the
that negative mean effects were assigned a value of zero under the significan
assumption that mothers do not really believe doctors' or parents' immune
time is detrimental to their children's health. reassuran
The coefficient estimates imply that changes in the uncertain nonemplo
health care technology do appear to affect consumption decisions in In Tabl
intuitively reasonable ways. An increase in the average health activities
effectiveness of parents' time (MEANPART) increases the time number
working mothers spend with their children, whereas an increase in DOCFEF
the uncertainty of those effects (VARPART) reduces time spent lute value
with Both effects are significant. An increase in the health car
effectiveness of preventive visits increases DOCPRV, whereas an one of th
238









































increase in variance tends to reduce DOCPRV, but this last result is
not statistically significant. DOCCUR appears unaffected by health
care technology, suggesting that curative visits may be largely
motivated by a desire for parental reassurance and comfort ("Have I
done all that's possible?") rather than direct child health effects.
From our previous results in (3ab), it appears that college-educated
mothers are more sensitive to this reassurance motive.
The remainder of the results in Table 4 are straightforward and
need no extensive interpretation. The health history of the child
(EARPAIN, COLDHIST) influences the decision to seek care in
the expected way. Older children (AGE) get less attention and less
doctor care, as do children from larger families (N). There is no sign
of sexual discrimination (MALE) by the working mother in her care
for children. Religious mothers spend more time with their chil-
dren; working, black mothers spend slightly less time with their
children. Healthy parents (PARHEAL) and future-oriented (FU-
TURE) parents tend to use preventive care more, whereas mothers
with faith in the curative power of doctors (DOCFAITH) use
preventive care less.
The pattern of the results for the nonworking-mother sample
(Table 5) are generally similar to those for working mothers. We do,
however, lose the inferior-good quality of parents' time with
children. The coefficient on INC in the PARTIME equation is
negative, but not significantly different from zero. DOCPRV and
DOCCUR are normal goods. Changes in doctor fees (DOCFEE)
have no appreciable effect on health care consumption, but changes
in time costs per doctor visit are quite important. Higher doctor
visit time costs reduce all health care activities, doctor visits as well
as parents' time with children.
The effects of health care technology on health care consumption
are basically similar to those observed for working mothers, except
that the mean effect of parents' time on health is no longer a
significant positive stimulus to PARTIME. DOCCUR is again
immune to changes in the technology, suggesting that parental
reassurance may be the key motivation for curative visits for
nonemployed mothers as well as for working mothers.
In Table 6 are the elasticities (at the means) of the health care
activities with respect to prices, income, technology, and the'
number of children in the family. Price elasticities (FULFEE,
DOCFEE, TIMWACE, WIFWAGE) rarely exceed 0.15 in abso-
lute value, supporting previous results on the price insensitivity of
health care demands.29 Variation in the TIMCOST of doctor visits is
one of the, strongest determinants of utilization, particularly for
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































'nonworking mothers. Here the elasticities range from —0.17 for
DOCPRV to -0.23 for DOCCUR.
The estimates of income elasticities show that the inferior-good
influence of income on parents' time with children is only a mild
one. For the working-mother sample, a 10 per cent rise in income
leads to at most a 1 per cent fall in parents' time. There is no
adverse effect of income on PARTIME for the nonworking-mother
sample.
Estimates of the elasticity of doctor visits with respect to income
center at 0.16 for the housewife sample and range from 0.2 to 0.56 in
the working-mother sample, depending onthemodel
specification—FULINC yielding the higher estimates. The results
for FULINC appear to be biased upward, however, because of the
assumption regarding working hours needed to define the variable.
The true income elasticity is probably closer to
The sensitivity of DOCCUR and PARTIME to changes in the
health care technology is slight, but the utilization of preventive
visits (DOCPRV) does seem rather responsive to alterations in the
perceived technology.
Finally, children in larger families have less time with parents,
but the actual amount lost is very small. For the working-mother
sample, however, there is a significant reduction in curative doctor
visits as N increases.
5.TOWARD A PUBLIC POLICY FOR
CHILDREN'S HEALTH
ENTinfections are one of the most prevalent of childhood diseases.
In addition to the discomfort for the child, parental anxiety, and lost
days from school and work that such diseases generate, there are
possible long-run implications to ENT illness as well. Left un-
treated, ear infections can lead to permanent hearing loss andlor
damage to the child's central nervous system. Chronic ENT disease
may mean poor school performance, poor adult health, and losses in
V futureearnings.3' If one of our health care objectives is to reduce
the prevalence of this class of diseases, what policy instruments
will work? Our empirical analysis of the family's provision of
children's health provides some initial insight into this question.
Table 7 lists the expected elasticities of a child's ENT health with
respect to three prominently mentioned sets of policy instruments:
(1) exogenous income andlor wage subsidies, (2) health insurance,
and (3) the availability of care.






































































































































































































































































































































































































)The results are based on the elasticities in Table 6 and on
calculatedelasticitiesfrom Table 2forthe NOSICK and
NOEARINF equations. For an upper estimate of the effectiveness
of policy on children's ENT health, the higher of the two input
elasticities from NOSICK and NOEARINF was used. A zero rather
than a negative elasticity was assigned to DOCPRV in the eighth
grade-public health equation and to PARTIME/N for the college-
private health equation. The only elasticities that are substantially
different from zero are 0.16 with respect to PARTIME/N and 0.17
with respect to DOCCUR for the eighth grade-public subsample,
0.082 with respect to DOCCUR for the high school-public subsam-
ple, and 0.045 with respect to DOCPRV and 0.041 with respect to
DOCCUR for the college-private subsample. The elasticities in
Table 7 are based on the sum of policy-induced changes in the use
of health care inputs (PARTIME, DOCCUR, DOCPRV) times
these average effects of inputs on health.32 The results are disaggre-
gated by the mother's educational level and work status.
Exogenous income transfers (INC) have a consistently positive
effect on children's health, primarily through the inducement to buy
more medical inputs. The effects of changes in the mother's wage is
unclear. Children whose employed mothers have low levels of
education are stimulated by the increase in WIFWACE to substi-
bite parents' time for less effective doctor visits. The net effect is an
increase in the child's chances for ENT health. A similar conclusion
probably holds for the employed mother, high school, and college
subsamples as well, but a likely downward bias in our estimate of
the effects of parent's time obscures this result.
A fall in the out-of-pocket costs of physician visits or in the time
cost of such visits also has a positive net effect on a child's health
prognosis. Such changes prompt an increase in use of physician
services without inducing a sufficiently strong offsetting reduction
in home care.
Although the effects of these policy changes on ENT health move
in the expected direction, what is perhaps surprising is how small
the average policy impact appears to be. Any sizable improvements
in ENT health prospects resulting from these economic policy
instruments will prove exceedingly costly. To increase the proba-
bility of NOSICK from 0.9 to 0.91—a 1 per cent improvement—may
require an increase in income equal to about 50 per cent of
husband's earnings (the main element in "exogenous" income) or a
25—50 per cent reduction'in TIMCOST. A reduction in doctor fees
appears no more effective. A 100 per cent reduction in out-of-
pocket costs (from $6 to $0), as with universal coverage national
243 The Family Provision of Children's Health jhealth insurance, will increase the probability of no ENT infections DATAAPPE
fora child from about 0.9 to 0.91—0.93. And each of these calcula-
tions assumes no offsetting rise in TIMCOST or fall in quality of The varial
care, both of which may arise when increased aggregate demand given for
hitsthe ambulatory care supply constraint. Whether these health
gains can justify such costly policy measures remains to be seen. SubsampleI The more effective policy strategies may be to improve medical
technology and parental health knowledge or to alter the patterns of Eighth gra
adult-child interactions. Improvements in medical technology or High scho
the health effectiveness of parents' time with children not only Working n
yield direct health payoffs through the attribute production func-
tion but also appear to induce an increased utilization of the more
effective inputs. The net effect may be quite sizable. From our VariableLis
productionand demand models, for example, a 10 per cent increase AGE: Ag
in the average health effectiveness of parents' time or doctor visits
will lead to a 4 per cent increase in the probability of NOSICK for
children whose mothers have an eighth grade education or less. For (ii 07 children in the higher mother-education subsamples a 1—2 per cent
increase in probability of NOSICK may result. In addition, for BLACK
children in the eighth grade sample, family planning or quality day
care may be a useful policy for improving a present child's health WM
prospect. Reducing the number of children under twelve (N) by .96
half can lead to a 2 per cent increase in the probability of (.03)
NOSICK.33 The reduction in N increases parents' time with each
child as well as the likelihood that a child, once sick, will be given
curative care. These two effects have a significant pro-health
impact for children in the lower-education subsample. 8CPUB
The point of presenting these numbers is not that they constitute .25
a true basis for a children's health policy, but rather to argue that we (20)
should think seriously about analyzing policy alternatives that
move beyond the usual income and price instruments of the DOCCUR
economic model. At least for one important class of childhood
diseases, improvements in health will not come easily. Efforts to 8GPUB
influence the family's health performance through the economic .65
parameters of price and income will yield only marginal improve- (1.01)
ments in children's ENT health. Changes in medical technology,
parent health knowledge, and the patterns of adult-child interaction DOCFAII
maybethe more promising policy directions.
National health insurance may still be our protector against the WM
financial risks of major illness, but it is not likely to be the cure for .72
our children's runny noses. (.19)
244 Inman 245 ThNT infections DATAAPPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
:hesecalcula- The variables are defined below and their means (variances) are in quality of given for each of the relevant subsamples. gate demand
these health
to be seen. Subsamplekey
medical
he patterns of Eighth grade-public: 8GPUBHigh school-public:HSPUB
echnology or High school-private: HSPRVCollege-private: COLPRV
tren not only Working mothers:WM Nonworking mothers: NWM
duction func-
n of the more
le. From our VariableList
centincrease AGE: Age of the child in years.
r doctor visits
NOSICK for 8GPUBHSPUBHSPRVCOLPRVWM NWM
7.28 6.84 6.96 7.07 7.38 6.56 n or less. For (11.07) (10,27) (9.14) (10.65) (9.80) (10.24)
1—2 per cent
addition, for BLACK:1 if child is black, 0 otherwise.
or quality day
child's health WM NWM
(N) by .96 .93
probability of (.03) (.07)
with each COLDHIST:1 if the child has three or more colds a year as will be given reported by parents, 0 otherwise. nt pro-health
e. 8GPUB HSPUBHSPRVCOLPRV WM NWM
iey constitute .25 .34 .36 .35 .34 .32
argue that we (.20) (.21) (.23) (.23) (.22) (.2 1)
rnatives that
iients of the DOCCUR: Number of visits to the doctor within the last six
of childhood months for ENT diseases as reported by the parents.
ily. Efforts to 8GPUB HSPUBHSPRVCOLPRV WM NWM
the economic .65 .63 .73 .96 .72 .72
ma! improve- (1.01) (1.36) (1.81) (2.58) (1.85) (1.54)
I technology,
id interaction DOCFAITH:1 if parents agree with "Doctors can cure most
serious diseases"; 0 otherwise.
or against the WM NWM
e the cure for .72 .73
(.19) (.19)







DOCPRV: Number of doctor check-ups for the child per year as WM
reported by the parents. .63
8GPUBHSPUBHSPRVCOLPRV WM NWM (.23)
.42 .66 .69 .99 .70 .69
(.56) (.79) (.72) (.74) (.72) (.77) N: Num
mont
EARPAIN:1 if child has complained to parents in last two weeks WM






EARSCAR:1 if either left or right ear shows scarring of tympanic .93
membrane, 0 otherwise. (.062)
8GPUBHSPUBHSPRVCOLPRV NOEARI:
.04 .026 .025 .018
(.04) (.034) (.024) (.029)
8GPU FUTURE:1 if parents disagree with Nowadays, a person has to
96
live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care (.042)








INCPC: Annual family income per member of family in 000's.
8GPUB HSPUBHSPRVCOLPRV
.87 1.11 1.84 2.55
(.71) (.62) (1.04) (1.39)




MARD:1 if mother currently married, 0 otherwise.
bud per year as WM NWM
.63 .58
NWM (.23) (.25)
2) (77) N:Number of children in the family between the ages of 6
months and 12 years.
last two weeks WM NWM
plugged ears; 2.40 3.03
(1.38) (1.77)
NOSICK:1 if child has no diagnosed ENT disease at time of
medical survey, 0 otherwise.
8GPUBHSPUBHSPRVCOLPRV
ing of tympanic .93 .90 .93 .89
(.062) (.09) (.06) (.09)
NOEARINF:1 if child has no diagnosed symptoms of ear in-
fection (tympanic membrane not red or amber!
yellow), 0 otherwise.
8GPUB HSPUBHSPRVCOLPRV a person has to
.96 .93 .97 .94 orrow take care (.042) (.059) (.025) (.058)





PARTIME: Amount of time'parents spend with all children per.
day in play or conversation. Based on response to the
question "Do you usually play or converse with your
inily in 000 5. children: (1).every day, (2) every other day, (3) once
or twice a week, (4) twice a month, (5) once a month
or less." Answers were scaled assuming each daily
contact with all children was about two hours.




PARTIME/N:Total estimated time divided by number of chil- wherei
dren between 6 months and 12 years. examp
Grossi
8GPUBHSPUBHSPRVCOLPRV conclu
.72 .75 .92 1.09 tive ir
(.26) (.25) (.31) (.34) depen
Rank I
RELIGION:1 if parents attend religious services once or more a
week, 0 otherwise. sures o
5.This is
WM NWM for ex-
.26 .30 6.One a
(.18) (.21) Cobb-
param
TIMCOST: The average travel plus average waiting time per x1. Wh







WIFWAGE: Estimated hourly wage of working mothers based on













Based on an estimated 20,000 practicing pediatricians earning an average ;
income of $40,000 yearly. The public budget figures include spending at the extens
federal, state, and local level on maternal and child health services and school the de
health. Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1973, pp. 68, 71. 8.Of co
2.We concentrate on physical healthiness both in the theoretical and empirical predic
portions of this study simply because the "economic model" is not well-suited See, S
for handling the discrete "taste changes" that are likely to accompany changes Condi
in mental health. (Febn
3.See also Michael Grossman, The Demandfor Health:ATheoreticaland Journa
EmpiricalInvestigation (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, assum
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insurance: A Theoretical and Empirical investigation, R-1054-OEO, The Rand
Corporation, July 1973.
4.This approach differs from the work of Grossman, The Demand for Health,
wherein subjective indices are used to specify the individual's healthiness—for
example, individual judgments of own health as poor, fair, good, excellent.
Grossman is sensitive to the limitations these subjective indices place on his
conclusions. Although conclusions about the statistical significance and rela-
tive importance of variables can often be made in models involving ordinal
dependent variables (see Sanford Labovitz, "The Assignment of Numbers to
Rank Order Categories," American Sociological Review (June 1970), conclu-
sions about measured marginal impacts are not valid. To correctly specify and
estimate a "health production function" requires cardinal, not ordinal, mea-
sures of output.
5.This is the approach to health care uncertainty used in all previous work. See,
for example, Phelps, Demand for Health Insurance.
6.One attractive specification of the attribute technology is to specify (1) as
Cobb-Doublas where (la) incorporates the random effect of Iias a shift
parameter, e5, andas an additive random term attached to the coefficients on
x,. Whenand t are normally distributed, health care attributes, A0, will be
lognormally distributed. For a full development of this case, see Robert Inman,
"Health-Care Demand When Outcomes Are Uncertain," mimeo., University of
Pennsylvania, 1974.
7.The demand specification above assumes that the consumer's health insurance
coverage is exogenously set, either through employment or publicly provided
coverage. The recent work of Charles Phelps, Demand for Health Insurance;
and Isaac Ehrlich and Gary Becker, "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance and
Self-Protection," Journal of Political Economy (July—August 1972), has led to
the development of models in which health care demand and insurance
coverage are jointly determined. Our model fits easily into their framework and
extends their analysis by allowing for the uncertain effects of health care
(self-protection) activities. In the more general model, the consumer's alloca-
tion problem can be split into two sequential decisions. At the start of each
period, the consumer decides on the level of health insurance coverage,
knowing the market prices of x and y, his income I, $,A0, and the
market-determined price of health insurance. The demand specifications in (3)
above are conditional on the extent of health insurance coverage, especially the
coinsurance rate that reduces the gross market prices for health services to the
net price, Pz,whichis used in (3). Substituting')intothe consumer's utility
function U[x, y,A(x)] and optimizing over the insurance parameters allows us
to specify preferred insurance coverage (see Phelps, The Demand for Health
Insurance). Once coverage is set, the consumer buys care according to (3). This
extension of our model that the price of insurance should be included in
the demand equations for health-related goods and services.
8.Of course, if we sufficiently restrict the specification of (la), and (2),
predictions about the demand effects of changes in p., anddo emerge.
See, for example, S. Turnovsky, "A Model of Consumer Behavior under
Conditions of Uncertainty in Supply," International Economic Review
(February 1971), and Walter Oi, "The Economics of Product Safety," The Bell
Journal of Economics and Management Science (Spring 1973). Turnovsky
assumes a quadratic specification for U() in (2), whereas Oi assumes a perfect
insurance market for commodity failures (in our case, sickness) or a "far-
sighted" consumer making many purchases of the good with the uncertain
249 The Family Provision of Children's HealthI
effect.Neither specification seems particularly attractive for our problem. In physica
another paper, "Health Care Demand When Outcomes Are Uncertain" amount
(mimeo.), University of Pennsylvania, 1974, I develop the demand specifica- levels.'
tions for a constant relative risk-aversion utility function with lognormally subsam
distributed health attributes. There I show that in the three-good cares 15.See L.
(preventive care, curative care, and y) with a single health attribute, consumers among:
who are sufficiently risk averse with respect to health (the Pratt-Arrow measure in the
of relative risk aversion exceeding 1) will increase their use of preventive or R. Duff
curative care as the expected marginal health impact for the good increases Row, ic
>0) or as the uncertainty of the marginal health impact declines Selectec
<0). Section 4 presents some tentative evidence to support this pre- Kegeles
diction in the case of children's health. Papani(
9.The emphasis here on the consumption benefits of child health care does not D. Ros
preclude the notion that health care can be a means to a further end—say, good vice by
school performance. However, the model does ignore the human capital Prentici
formation motive for child health care allocations. See, for example, Michael accurat
Grossman, "The Correlation between Health and Schooling," National Bureau higher
of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 22, December 1973; and Marc 16.TIMCC
Nerlove, "Household and Economy, Toward a New Theory of Population and visits
Economic Growth," Journal of Political Economy, Part II (March—April 1974). doc
I provide some tentative evidence on the choice between the two models in plus wi
Section 4. See the discussion of the variable FUTURE below, and the results 17. WIFW
in tables 4 and 5 for this variable. tional
10.The survey was conducted as part of the National Academy of Sciences, availab]
Institute of Medicine, study entitled "Contrasts in Health Status: An Analysis Sun.ey,
of Contrasting Forms of Medical Care Delivery." The survey involved a 18.DOCF
detailed questionnaire of family health attitudes, economic status, and utiliza- dunng
tion of health care facilities within six months prior to the date of the interview, doctor
Interviews were conducted from December 1970 to April 1971. There were costs f
1,435 families in the study's final sample. Children between the ages of 6 out-of-1
months and 12 years in the sample families were then given a detailed ENT cause o
clinical examination and those over 3 years were given sight and hearing initial P
examinations as well. Approximately 2,600 children were examined by the up visit
survey's panel of physicians. My working sample based on complete data for all 19.Theil s
variables used in this study came to 1,692 children. specific
11.An earlier version of this paper also examined nose infections, but Lee Benham Henri
correctly pointed out that because of the very low prevalence rate and often pp. 622
small sample sizes, these results were virtually useless. only be
12.For a biological model generating a logit specification for (1,0) health attri- certau
butes, see J. Truett, J. Cornfield, and W. Kannel, "A Multivariate Analysis of health
Risk of Coronary Care," Journal of Chronic Disease (April 1967). iance 0
13.See David Kessner and D. McEldowney, "The Epidemiology of Otitis Media," model,
in K. S. Gerwin and A. Glorig (editors), Otitis Media: Proceedings of the bly not
National Conference (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1972). functio
14.Parents' time per day per child in play or conversation is based on the parents' 20.Compa
response to the question, "Do you usually play or converse with your children: coeffici
(1) every day, (2) every other day, (3) once or twice a week, (4) twice a month, when
(5) once a month or less?" Answers were then scaled into an estimate of total mates o
parents' time (PARTIME) with all children by assuming that each daily contact two est
with all children consumed about two hours. Recent work by Arleen Leibowitz, mental
"Education and Home Production," American Economic Review (May 1974), should
finds that parents do spend, on average, about two hours per day on the 21.The co
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s per day on the
physical and educational care of their children. Leibowitz also finds that the
amount of time per contact is not significantly related to parents' educational
levels. This fact is relevant, since our production model will be estimated for
subsamples based on mothers' educational levels.
15.See L. Pratt et at., "Physicians' Views on the Level of Medical Information
among Patients," in W. Scott and E. Volkhaut (editors), Medical Care: Readings
in the Sociology of Medical Institutions (New York: John Wiley, 1966); and
R. Duff and A. Hollingshead, Sickness and Society (New York: Harper and
Row, 1968). Also, J. Samora et al., "Knowledge about Specific Diseases in Four
Selected Samples," Journal of Health and Human Behavior (Fall 1952); S. S.
Kegeles etal.,"Survey of Beliefs about Cancer Detection and Taking
Papanicoloan Tests," Public Health Reports, No. 80, September 1965; and
D. Rosenblatt and E. Suchman, "The Under-utilization of Medical Care Ser-
vice by Blue Collarites," in Blue Collar World (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, 1954), have found that lower socioeconomic families have less
accurate information about the causes and characteristics of many diseases than
higher socioeconomic families.
16. TIMCOST equals the average travel and waiting time for the child for doctor
visits over the six months prior to the family interview. If the child did not go to
the doctor during this period, TIMCOST was calculated as the average travel
plus waiting time of his or her siblings' visits.
17. WIFWAGE is approximated by the average hourly earnings for the occupa-
tional class in which the mother is employed. Exact wage data were not
available. Occupational wage information was obtained from the Area Wage
Survey, 1970, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Washington, D.C.
18. DOCFEE equals the average out-of-pocket costs of the child's physician visits
during the six months prior to the family interview. If the child did not go to the
doctor during this period, DOCFEE was set equal to the average out-of-pocket
costs for the child's siblings' visits. Defining DOCFEE as an average of
out-of-pocket costs sidesteps the errors-in-variables problems that arise be-
cause of the common physician practice of "two-part" a high
initial price for each "work-up" visit and then low to zero prices for all follow-
up visits.
19.Theil's work on "models with random coefficients" offers a richer econometric
specification ol our model, closer to the spirit of the work in Section 2. See
Henri Theil, Principles of Econometrics (New York: John Wiley, 1971),
pp. 622—627. In the framework above, uncertainty about health effects arises
only because of inadequate inference on the part of the consumer of a true,
"certain" health effect, 13. Actually, of course, 13 is rarely known exactly even by
health professionals with large samples. Theil's specification allows the var-
iance of 13 to remain, even as sample size increases. For testing of our demand
model, the extension into Theil's "models with random coefficients" is proba-
bly not worth the added effort. But in an analysis of health attribute production
functions, it is an extension that should be seriously considered.
20.Comparing the results in Table 2 with my initial estimates of the DOCCUR
coefficient shows a significant downward bias in the DOCCUR coefficient
when this "instrumental variables" procedure was not employed. The esti-
mates of the other coefficients in the model are nearly identical between the
two estimating procedures. However, the asymptotic properties of this instru-
mental variables procedure for the logit model are not known, and the reader
should treat these parameter estimates with suitable caution.
21.The coefficientis in effect the slope of the "production possibility frontier"
251 The Family Provision of Children's Healthfor child attributes. Given a level of family inputs, more of one attribute may they app
mean less of another. the role
22.An argument similar to the one just presented for the bias in the PARTIME/N expecte
coefficients can be developed for the income per capita variable as well. If (negativi
parental income is positively related to child IQ and self-worth, as one might here. Se.
expect (6 > 0), then from the model above, the estimated coefficients on INCPC Than Mi
will be biased toward zero. As with the bias to parents' time effects, I know of The n
no evidence that will permit us to judge the seriousness of this underestima- ENT
tion. with DC
The arguments here are not likely to apply to the doctor visit inputs or to past exceed 0
health states since the direct relationship of these variables to IQ or self-worth The fo
are likely to be negligible (60). recent hi
23.If the parameter estimates, arenormally distributed as N(j311, then (of whicl
the paret statistical tests for the equality of means and variances across subsamples for
each health care input can be made. For a test of equality of variances, the test secluenti
that we ( statistic is the ratio of variance estimates that is distributed as F with
decide t( parameters (n —1,n —1),where n =200.The null hypothesis of equal child is
is rejected for all comparisons made by pairs at the 0.9 level and for all but three
atest of equality of means (=a's)of two normal parents
populations with known but different variances, the test statistic is V expectei
— + al/n), which is distributed as x2withone degree of freedom. process. The null hypothesis of equal mean effect was rejected for all pairwise is recun
comparisons at the 0.9 level except for the comparison offor DOCPRV for children
the high school-public and the high school-private subsamples. enough Yet even if one accepts the normality assumption for the formal permit u
tests. for equality of the PARTIME/N coefficients and their variances are biased
28. fact in an unknown direction because of the bias in our estimates of PARTIME/N.
Although we can say with some confidence thatfor PARTIME/N is biased biased f
downward, no conclusions about the direction. of bias in its standard error nearly c
the deg can be made. Thusis biased away from the true variance in an unknown
the mod
direction and the formal tests above for PARTIME/N are therefore biased in an VARPA
unknown direction. Caution should be the keyword here. drawing
24.The pattern is identical for the coefficients and varianceestimates from the in (ic) r
NOEARINF equation. bias in
25.See, for example, Arleen Leibowitz, "Home Investments in Children,' 'journal educatli
of Political Economy (March—April 1972), Part II; and Jerome Kagan and H. A. 29.See, for
Moss, "Parental Correlates of Child's IQ and Height," Child Deuelopment Price an
(September 1959).
. 30.To chec
26.See Arnold Zellner, "An Efficient Method of Estimating Seemingly Unrelated preferre
Regressions and Tests for Aggregation Bias," American Statistical Association a + B
journal (June 1962). WAGE]
27.The fact that our analysis is restricted to the provision of ENT health for reduced
children makes the first three assumptions less troublesome than they might be WIFWA
for an adult health study or a study of "major" (e.g., crippling) child diseases.
Family health coverage is largely exogenous (publicly provided or part of the lie near
employee contract) for our sample. For those families buying supplemental 31.For an
insurance, it is unlikely that this coverage will be motivated by a child's ENT earning
diseases. Schooli
The choice of the provider—and subsequently the provider's location, which Decemi
helps define TIMCOST—is also likely to be independent of a child's ENT 32.The use
health. The possible exceptions are children with chronic ENT problems, but
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they appear to be few in our sample. Acton's simultaneous equation estimate of
the role of outpatient visits as a determinant of travel distance is negative, as
expected, but not significant. However, in Acton's work distance is a significant
(negative) determinant of outpatient visits, a result similar to the one obtained
here. See Jan Acton, "Demand for Health Care When Time Prices Vary More
Than Money Prices," R-1189-OEO/NYC, The Rand Corporation, May 1973.
The mother's work status is also independent of the family's provision for
ENT health. The correlations of mother's work status (1 if works, 0 otherwise)
with DOCCUR, PARTIME, DOCPRV, EARPAIN, and COLDHIST never
exceed 0.03.
The fourth assumption that assumes the exogeneity of family size is counter to
recent household models that argue that number (N) and "quality" of children
(of which ENT health is a part) are jointly determined. An alternative view of
the parents' decision to have and care for children is to treat the decisions as a
sequential process of decision, learning, and decision subject to the constraint
that we cannot freely destroy the fruits of prior labor, In such a model, parents
decide to have a child and once it is born care for that child as they see fit. The
child is a blessing or a burden relative to prior expectations. If a blessing
("quality" greater than expected), they decide to have another. Once born, the
parents care for both children as best they choose. Again they compare
expected "joy" to received "joy" and decide to have another child or stop the
process. It is clear that the fertility-child "quality" model being suggested here
is recursive and allows us to identify the true effects on the provision of
children's health. Unfortunately, our data base is not sufficiently rich to allow
enough degrees of over-identification so thatN might be made endogenous and
permit us to test these alternative models of the fertility/child-raising process.
28.The fact that our estimates of the mean effect and the variance of this effect are
biased for PARTIME/N will not alter our conclusions if the degree of bias is
nearly constant across the four subsamples. I have argued earlier, however, that
the degree of bias may be systematically related to mother's education. If so,
the mother's education should be included in (ic) along with MEANPART and
VARPART. But multicollineanty between these variables prevents us from
drawing any inferences about the effects of technology in this case. The results
in (ic) must therefore be treated as tentative, limited by the proviso that the
bias in MEANPART and VARPART is not systematically related to parental
education.
29.See, for example, J. P. Newhouse and Charles E. Phelps, "New Estimates of
Price and Income Elasticities of Medical Care Services," in this volume,
30.To check for this bias, I reestimated equations (la), (2a), and (3a), specifying
preferred hours worked (tm) to be a linear function of WIFWAGE. Substituting t,,,
=a+ 8 WIFWAGE into the definition of FULINC [=INC + (T —
WAGE] and this new specification of FULINC into our demand model yielded
reduced-form equations in prices, technology, tastes and INC. WIFWAGE, and
WIFWAGE2. Estimating these equations gave "corrected" utilization elas-
ticities with respect to income of about 0.25, suggesting that the true elasticities
lie nearer the lower end of the original range.
31,For an interesting study relating childhood health to schooling and adult
earnings, see Michael Grossman, Correlation between Health and
Schooling," National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 22,
December 1973.
32.The use of the elasticities based on mean health effect,withoutregard to the
253 The Family Provision of Children's Healthstandard errors of these estimates implicitly assumes that society should be The dem
risk neutral when allocating resources to children's health. For arguments to plus variab
justifythis assumption, see Kenneth Arrow and Robert Lind, "Uncertainty and and the vi
the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions," American Economic Review children's
(June 1970). Investigatin
33.For a summary of other studies that find that smaller families mean healthier inputs to
children, see Joel D. Wray, "Population Pressure on Families: Family Size and effectiveth Child Spacing," in National Academy of Sciences, Rapid Population Growth
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Inman raises two important questions in this paper: (1) How do physician Washington
visits and parents' time spent with children affect children's health? and a large pen
(2) How responsive are parents to the health benefits their children receive in part
from these two inputs? To provide answers to these questions, he develops physician v
and estimates a production function for children's health and a demand wife's occu
function for health inputs. Iwill comment on each of these in turn, family iricoi
In the production function for children's health, health status is measured by visiting a
three dummy variables indicating whether the child had an ear, nose, or throat variables ai
infection; an inner ear infection; or a cold. Approximately 10 per cent of the proxies for
children in the sample had one or more of these illnesses; less than 3 percent rates are in
had a cold. The combination of the relatively small sample sizes and the small tion of the i
proportion of ill children raises serious questions about the reliability of the the results
production function estimates. As an extreme case, Table 2 indicates an example, In
eighth grade sample size of 136. According to the overall sample characteris-
tics,approximately 4 children in that group had colds. The dependent related to d
(dummy) variable therefore has a value of 1in approximately 132 cases and with childre
zero in the other 4.Itis difficult to have confidence in. production function good with r
estimates based on such small numbers.
. aGiffen go
Evenifthe,samplesizeis accepted as adequate for estimating the additional
systematic association between children's health status and the inputs income an
examined, the results in Table 2 provide only very weak support for the view The prob
that children's health status is positively associated with inputs of physician cies and S
visits and parents' time. Of the 36 estimates of input coefficients reported, 22 important
are positive and 14 negative. Furthermore, these estimates are rarely signifi- both the po
cantly different from zero.I am not persuaded that productivity benefits from and
these inputs have been shown. these quest
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The demand function includes the usual price and income components
plus variables obtained from the production function concerning the mean
and the variance of the effect of parents' time and physician visits on
children's health. lnman's approach isclever.Itprovides a method of
investigating the response of parents to the benefits and uncertainties of
inputs to improve their children's health. As these inputs become more
effective, the demand should increase, ceteris paribus. As the variance of the
effects increases, however, the demand should decline if consumers are risk
averse. The problem here, however, is that the measures of health benefits
used in the demand equation are taken from the production function esti-
mates. If there are no benefits from physician visits or parents' time, or if the
production function estimates are not reliable because of sample size, the
coefficient estimates for the health productivity variables in the demand
equation will not be meaningful. Thus I do not believe that the estimated
coefficients of the variables representing the mean and variance of productiv-
ity of parents' time and physician visits shown in Table 4 are reliable
indicators of parents' demands for these services.
There is a further problem in the demand equation. Several variables that
contain both wage (price) and income components are included simultane-
ously. Consider the composition of the variables included in equations (la),
(2a), and (3a) in Table 4. WIFWAGE is the estimated hourly wage of the
mother based on the earnings of women with the same occupation in the
Washington, D.C., area. The average occupational wage rate surely includes
a large permanent income component, and the coefficient of this variable will
in part measure the impact of income on the demand for parents' time and
physician visits. FIJLINC is a measure of full family income that includes the
wife's occupational wage times a fixed number of hours per year plus other
family income. FULFEE includes wife's wage multiplied by the time cost of
visiting a physician plus the physician's fee.Inaddition, three dummy
variables are entered for parents' years of schooling. These variables are also
proxies for permanent income. Since several measures of income and wage
rates are included simultaneously as independent variables, the interpreta-
tion of the individual coefficients is not obvious. This is perhaps why some of
the results appear curious when given a straightforward interpretation. For
example, lnman writes, "WIFWAGE, the 'price' of parents' time with children,
is positively related to PARTIME (parents' time with children) and negatively
related to doctor visits. These results suggest that for working mothers time
with children is an inferior good with respect to income changes and a Giffen
good with respect to changes in WIFWAGE!" Economists have been seeking
a Giffen good for a long time. Before we conclude that the quest has ended,
additional analysis will be necessary to obtain more precise measures of
income and substitution effects.
The problems discussed above are primarily attributable to data deficien-
cies and should not detract from lnman's contributioninraising some
important issues. He has been clever in developing a model that examines
both the productivity of inputs on health status and the effects of productivity
and uncertainty on the demand for inputs, It is time that we knew more about
these questions, and Inman has given us a good start.
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David S. Salkever
The Johns Hopkins University largely de
dence rate
physical h
There are a number of aspects of Inman's analysis that deserve comment. Let variables
mefirstoffera more general commendation. Although the health of children has difference
attracted little attention from economists, it is clearly a major area of current environme
public policy concern. Although the government health care initiatives of the on these d
1960s diminished social-class differences in the receipt of medical care Again tl
among adults, their impact on children's medical care was modest at best, physical h
The ramifications of poor health status and underconsumption of care among lated with
children in lower social classes are probably very significant; Grossman's these diffe
recent work (1973) suggests that the formation of "health capital" in childhood recent hea
has very significant effects on the accumulation of several forms of human dent varial
capital in later life. We are indebted to Inman, as well as Grossman, for obtained d
bringing the issue to our attention in a forceful and interesting way. today's ca
As for the empirical analysis, let me first point out that Inman's production variables v
function estimates are not exactly encouraging. Leaving aside the few be shocke
coefficients with significant and correct signs, his results generally suggest significant.
that both parental and professional inputs to the medical care production One 0th
process have little or no impact on the ENT health of children and that the least be m
same is true of the "material environment" (INCPC). But if this is the case, Kessner,e
what weapons have we in the war against ENT disease? Are we really as suffering fr
helpless as these results imply? Perhaps because I have been brainwashed is a retatio
by the medical profession and the social epidemiologists, I am reluctant to then Inma
accept this conclusion and therefore am inclined to search for other explana- individual
tions of these results. In summ
One possible explanation concerns the way Inman has divided his sample. I would no
By estimating separate equations for samples defined by educational level, affect the
he seems to have substantially limited the range of variation of a number of from the N
variables within each equation. For example, data in his appendix suggest exist amo
systematic variations across samples in per capita income and parental time quences o
inputs that are large relative to within-sample standard errors. This loss. (Diffi
homogeneity within samples may be an important explanation for the consist- strongly s
ently insignificant findings. medical
Another explanation, and the one that I regard as most important, relates to relating to
Inman's choice of dependent variables. These are 0-1 dummies indicating the The problE.
presence or absence of colds or ear infections. By and large, these illnesses reliable qu
probably tend to be mild and short-lived even if untreated. The importance-.oJ Turning
their prevalence as a measure of health status is not readily apparent. But brief comr
what is most significant is the resistance of these infections (particularly viral working-rn
infections) to prevention or amelioration by medical care of either the profes- are negath
sional or parental variety. Therefore, zero marginal products for medical care includes ti
inputs are generally what we would expect. waiting tirr
It could, however, be argued that an alternative interpretation of Inman's Second,,
dependent variables is more appropriate. Given the natural history of most because it
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point in time are
largely determined by variations in incidence rates; and variations in inci-
dence rates are probably associated with more fundamental differences in
physical health that determine susceptibility to infection. lnman's dependent
variables could therefore be viewed as proxies for these more fundamental
differences. Should we not then be surprised at the result that the "material
environment" and parental and professional care have no appreciable effects
on these differences?
Again the answer is no, but for a different reason. The differences in
physical health that determine susceptibility must certainly be highly corre-
lated with recent health history. But if his dependent variable is a proxy for
these differences, lnman's inclusion of independent variables describing
recent health history leads me to expect the insignificance of other indepen-
dent variables. This same point could be made by an unfair analogy. If we
obtained data from a cross-section of firms and ran a regression in which
today's capital stock was the dependent variable and the two independent
variables were yesterday's capital stock and something else, we would hardly
be shocked to find that only the coefficient for yesterday's capital stock was
significant.
One other possible explanation of the production function results should at
least be mentioned. In their more extensive study of the data used by Inman,
Kessner, eta!. (1974) concluded that the medical services provided to children
suffering from ear infections were of poor or at best mediocre quality. If there
is a relationship between this quality rating and the efficacy of care provided,
then Inman's findings are attributable, at least inpart, to the failures of
individual physicians rather than the limitations of medical science.
In summary, I am not sanguine about curing our children's runny noses, but
I would not conclude from Inman's results that health policy can do little to
affect the ENT health of children. There is, after all, considerable evidence—
from the National Health Examination Survey and elsewhere—that variations
exist among income and educational groups in the more serious conse-
quences of ear infection, such as scarring of the eardrum and resultant hearing
loss. (Differences in lnman's sample means for EARSCAR bear this out.) I
strongly suspect that these variations are attributable to differencesin
medical care, parental care, and the "material environment" and that policies
relating to these variables would indeed pay off in terms of better ENT health.
The problem for now is to build on the work considered here to obtain more
reliable quantitative estimates of policy effects.
Turning to Inman's estimated demand functions,Ishall only offer several
brief comments. First, it is interesting that in the doctor-visit equations for the
working-mothers sample, the cross-price effects (i.e., the wage coefficients)
are negative. A possible explanation is that the time cost of medical services
includes time at home in following the doctor's orders as well as travel and
waiting time.
Second, the use of out-of-pocket cost as a price measure poses problems
because it does not take account of differing insurance coverage. That is,
insured persons may purchase more services per doctor visit than uninsured
persons or they may frequent higher-quality providers, and their out-of-pocket
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costs may be the same or higher. Clearly, they face a lower price than REFERENCE
uninsured persons, although the out-of-pocket cost measure of price will
1G understate this difference.
.rossman,
Third,I am uneasy with the parental time demand equations for several 2.KessnerD
reasons. The reported means and standard deviations of the parental time (was
variable indicate very little variability.I suspect that this is not true in reality
but that Inman's measure is simply too crude to pick up much of the variability
that in fact exists. Also, since this variable measures total time input, only a
small part of which will be health-related, it is surprising to find significant
cross-effects for the time and money prices of medical care. This is rather like
finding that the demand for television sets is significantly related to the price
of tickets to a baseball game. Finally,I am not wholly convinced by Inman's
argument that parental time inputs and the number of children are not
simultaneously determined. Even if parents do not formulate multiperiod
maximization problems, they may have rather stable preferences for the
manner (including time inputs) in which they raise their children, and they will
take these into account in deciding how many children to have.
I have thus far avoided discussing Inman's theoretical framework. But with
national health insurance so much in the air,I suppose it is imperative that
one's comments achieve universal coverage. For the sake of completeness,
then, Ioffer the following two observations.
First, Inman has skillfully expanded on previous work by explicitly introduc-
ing uncertainty into his demand model. However, this may be a mixed
blessing. Although it adds realism, it also complicates empirical implementa-
tion. Given our current difficulties in simply getting reasonable estimates for
production function coefficients, one cannot help but feel a little nervous
about demand functions that include the variances of these coefficients as
independent variables.
Second, Inman's logit production functions differ from previous work in that
past health status enters multiplicatively. In the past, this variable has been
added to a health-increment production function to obtain current health
status. The difficulty with Inman's multiplicative specification is that it results
in marginal products for medical care that decrease as past health status
decreases. The sicker you are, the less the doctor can do for you. Although
there may be some instances in which this is true, as a generalization it is not
very appealing. It also seems to suggest that illness reduces the demand for
medical care, a result that is certainly counter-intuitive.
I would like to conclude with a more general observation, a comment on my
comments. A number of the criticisms I have raised about the empirical work
in this paper relate directly to deficiencies in data. Although Inman's analysis
isinteresting and well executed,itis obviously constrained by these
deficiencies. And it is just as obvious that further progress in this important
area of economic research will depend on the relaxation of data constraints. I
believe the best way to ensure this progress is to become actively involved in
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